A little housekeeping. Due to hardware limitations of the server and concerns about the SKS software/protocol, the Philly Mesh keyserver will be offline until further notice.
Now that we have erected an SKS keyserver, I invite everyone to sign the Philly Mesh GPG key to help verify our identity. There are many GPG/PGP applications out there, but below I will provide steps for the
gpg utility available on many POSIX systems (Linux, Darwin, etc.). Ideally, with enough signatures, the Philly Mesh key has a higher probability of entering the Web of Trust strong set, the largest collection of strongly-connected gpg keys.
Receive the Philly Mesh Key
Before you can sign the Philly Mesh key, you will need to download it to your system via a keyserver. Here is an example using the SKS server pool:
$ gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys 0x8f5b291d3a3ca65a gpg: requesting key 3A3CA65A from hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net gpg: no ultimately trusted keys found gpg: Total number processed: 1 gpg: imported: 1
Now, you should be able to list the Philly Mesh key in your public keyring. Make sure that the key has not been revoked and is not expired:
$ gpg --list-keys 0x8f5b291d3a3ca65a pub 4096R/3A3CA65A 2017-11-25 [expires: 2027-11-23] uid Philly Mesh <firstname.lastname@example.org> uid Philly Mesh <email@example.com> uid Mike Dank <firstname.lastname@example.org> sub 4096R/1744B74A 2017-11-25 [expires: 2027-11-23]
Before you sign the Philly Mesh key, you want to make sure that it is actually owned by Philly Mesh. For some people, this is as easy as asking me online somewhere or in person. For others, you might want to check the verifications for Philly Mesh on Keybase which shows that this key has been verified by the
phillymesh.net domain. For those who want some instant verification that this key is associated with the domain
phillymesh.net, you can query against a DNS record on the domain which holds the key’s fingerprint.
First, let’s see the fingerprint for the key you have just received:
$ gpg --fingerprint 0x8f5b291d3a3ca65a pub 4096R/3A3CA65A 2017-11-25 [expires: 2027-11-23] Key fingerprint = C58B 0431 C815 F315 7310 0959 8F5B 291D 3A3C A65A uid Philly Mesh <email@example.com> uid Philly Mesh <firstname.lastname@example.org> uid Mike Dank <email@example.com> sub 4096R/1744B74A 2017-11-25 [expires: 2027-11-23]
Now, let’s query against
fingerprint.phillymesh.net, which pulls a live
TXT record set up on the domain housing the trusted fingerprint:
$ dig +short -t txt fingerprint.phillymesh.net "C58B 0431 C815 F315 7310 0959 8F5B 291D 3A3C A65A"
The fingerprint from the
gpg --fingerprint command should match the result from the
dig command. If it doesn’t match, don’t trust the key. Someone may be in control of the
phillymesh.net domain and try to get you to trust their false key.
Sign the Key
Now, you are ready to sign the Philly Mesh key. At this point, we assume that you have already created a key of your own. While receiving the key in the initial section above, we also assume you have made sure the key has not expired or been revoked.
Sign the Philly Mesh key with your own key, following the prompts as they come up. At the time of this writing there are 3 uids (email addresses) associated with this key (listed below in the command output). They can each safely be signed:
$ gpg --sign-key 0x8f5b291d3a3ca65a gpg: checking the trustdb gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 1 signed: 0 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 1u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2027-11-23 pub 4096R/3A3CA65A created: 2017-11-25 expires: 2027-11-23 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate sub 4096R/1744B74A created: 2017-11-25 expires: 2027-11-23 usage: E [ultimate] (1). Philly Mesh <firstname.lastname@example.org> [ultimate] (2) Philly Mesh <email@example.com> [ultimate] (3) Mike Dank <firstname.lastname@example.org> Really sign all user IDs? (y/N) y
After signing, send the key back to the keyserver so the signature is recorded:
$ gpg --keyserver pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-key 0x8f5b291d3a3ca65a gpg: sending key 3A3CA65A to hkp server pool.sks-keyservers.net
That’s all it takes! Your signature will now be recorded and the record will update across all keyservers in the SKS pool. You can check that your signature has been recorded here (it might take a few minutes to populate).
After a trial run of setting up a keyserver over the summer, I am now making the Philly Mesh OpenPGP Keyserver public for all to use.
The keyserver currently runs SKS, and is ideal for uploading or downloading gpg/pgp keys. A great feature of SKS is that it has what are known as “gossip peers.” Gossip peers help with the transmission of keys uploaded on each node by sending them to all other nodes they gossip with. This creates a web that allows all nodes to communicate and transfer keys through one another. Ultimately, if a key is uploaded to one node, it will end up on all of the others in the network.
The Philly Mesh keyserver, available at gpg.phillymesh.net, is now part of several official server pools run by sks-keyservers.net. If you currently use the
gpg utiliy, you may already be accessing it!
Of course, you can always use gpg.phillymesh.net specifically instead of via a server pool. The server has unencrypted HKP available on ports 80 and 11371, and encrypted HKPS available on ports 443 and 11372.
Additionally, this keyserver is available with HKP access over Hyperboria at the address h.gpg.phillymesh.net, and over the Tor network at the address phillygoh7mkcb44.onion. HKPS is not necessary over these networks as they are already end-to-end encrypted.
Here are some examples of how to access the keyserver:
# Clearnet access over HKP (IPv4/IPv6) $ gpg --keyserver gpg.phillymesh.net --recv-keys 3A3CA65A # Clearnet access over encrypted HKPS (IPv4/IPv6) # Note, you may need gnupg-curl, not just gnupg # Do: sudo apt-get install gnupg-curl $ gpg --keyserver 'hkps://gpg.phillymesh.net' --recv-keys 3A3CA65A # Hyperboria access over HKP $ gpg --keyserver h.gpg.phillymesh.net --recv-keys 3A3CA65A # Tor access over HKP $ gpg --keyserver phillygoh7mkcb44.onion --recv-keys 3A3CA65A
Philly Mesh now has a public GPG key that you can use for any email correspondence you would like (it is completely optional to use). Using GPG ensures that Philly Mesh will be the only entity that can read any email you send. The 4096-bit GPG key has been uploaded to the MIT Public Key Server, and can be checked here, where you will also be able to see that it was signed by me personally. Additionally, you can also see the key over on Keybase.
Philly Mesh now also has a ProtonMail email address at for any sensitive matters that you do not believe can be discussed through any other email provider. The address for this account is at email@example.com.
In our ever-changing world, you never know who or what may be reading.
For easy access, the GPG key is pasted below!
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